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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UTAH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIA-
TION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff cmd Appellant, 
-vs.-
WILBURN DALE HELM and 
MARIE L. HELM, his wife, 
Defendamts amd Respondents. 
Case 
No.10509 
P'etition for Rehearing 
The appellant hereby petitions the above-entitled 
court for a rehearing of the above-entitled appeal on the 
ground that said court erred by affirming the trial court's 
Order denying plaintiff permission to file Count III of its 
proposed Amended Complaint, which Count states a valid 
cause of action for reformation, and by affirming the trial 
court's Order denying plaintiff's motion for an Order 
requiring plaintiff to make deposits into court pendente 
lite. 
Dated this 30th day of April, 1966. 
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES & HENDERSON 
By KENT B LINEBAUGH 
800 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Pla.intiff and Appellant 
In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UTAH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIA-
TION, a Utah corporation, 
Plaimtiff Otnd Appellant, 
-vs.-
WILBURN DALE HELM and 
MARIEL. HELM, his wife, 
Defendants Otnd Respondents. 
Case 
No. 10509 
Brief in Support of Petition 
for Rehearing 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Originally this was an action for a Declaratory Judg-
ment declaring and determining the meaning of a lease 
between the plaintiff as lessee and the defendants as 
lessors or, in the alternative, a reformation of said lease. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 
Summary J udgmeut was granted in favor of the de-
f en<lants and the plaintiff's Motions to set aside the Sum-
mary Judgment, for permission to file an Amended Com-
plnint and for an Order requiring the plaintiff to make 
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deposits in court pendente lite were denied. From the 
Summary Judgment and denial of the plaintiff's Mo-
tions, the plaintiff appealed. Upon appeal, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court, awarding costs to the 
respondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiff seeks a rehearing on the propriety of deny-
ing plaintiff permission to file Count III of its proposed 
Amended Complaint and the court's refusal to require 
the plaintiff to make deposits in court pendente lite. Pur-
suant to said rehearing, the plaintiff seeks an Order 
granting plaintiff permission to file Count III of its pro-
posed Amended Complaint and an Order requiring the 
plaintiff to make deposits in court pendente lite. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 5, 1961 the defendants Wilburn Dale Helm 
and Marie L. Helm, his wife, as lessors, entered into a 
written lease agreement with the plaintiff, Utah Coopera-
tive Association. (R. 7) The leased property consisted 
of a service station located on the old State Highway 
just North of Orem, Utah, and the plaintiff undertook 
to operate the service station pursuant to the lease agree-
ment. (R. 3, 7, 4) 
At the time of entering into the lease, the plaintiff 
and the defendants were aware that the leased premises 
would be used by the plaintiff as a service station and 
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that the new freeway now completed between Lehi and 
Provo was then being planned. (R. 3, 4, 16, 26) 
Upon completion of the contemplated freeway, due 
to the alteration of the flow of traffic away from the 
leased premises, the plaintiff maintained to the def end-
ants that certain provisions in the lease allowed the 
plaintiff to surrender and cancel the lease and be re-
lieved from the payment of rent or any other obligation 
thereunder. (R. 5, 16, 53) However, the defendants con-
tended that the plaintiff had no right to surrender or can-
cel the lease and demanded continued payment of the 
monthly rental. (R. 5, 16, 18, 53) Subsequently, the 
plaintiff's original Complaint was filed on July 1, 1965, 
(R. 15, 22) whereby the plaintiff sought a Declaratory 
Judgment which would relieve the plaintiff of any obli-
gations whatsoever under the lease. Thereafter, the de-
fendants answered the Complaint and moved for Sum-
mary Judgment, which judgment was granted in their 
favor. 
Upon notifiication of the Summary Judgment against 
it, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the Summary 
Judgment, (R. 55) together with motions for permission 
to file an Amended Complaint, (R. 51) and for an Order 
requiring the plaintiff to make deposits in court pendente 
lite. (R. 50) In Count III of the proposed Amended 
Complaint, the plaintiff set forth an alternative cause of 
action for reformation of the lease to make it conform 
to the actual agreement of the parties. (R. 31) 
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Paragraph 11 of Count III of the proposed Amende(J 
Complaint alleges as follows : 
11. That the following is a true agreement of 
the parties with reference to paragraph 7 of said 
lease agreement: 
7. Lessors shall keep in force at their ex-
pense sufficient fire and comprehensive insur-
ance on the building to pay for the repair or 
construction of said building if it is damager! 
or destroyed by fire or other casualty, whi<>h 
policy shall contain a loss payable clause in 
favor of lessee as its interest may appear. If 
the premises are rendered wholly or partially 
unfit for occupancy by any such damage or 
destruction, or if for any reason, including the 
substantial or material alteration of the florn 
of traffic away f ram the leased premises as a 
result of the use of the anticipated Interstate 
Highway No. 15 in the Oreni, Utah area, 
which hi,qhway is planned for construction 
in the Orem, Utah area as of the date of this 
agreement, the possession or beneficial use of 
the premises is interfered with, the rent here-
under shall abate until the premises are fully 
restored to fitness for occupancy or such in-
terference has ceased. It is understood and 
agreed that if by reason of any law, ordinance 
or regulation of properly constituted author-
ity or by injunction, lessee is prevented from 
using- aH or any substantial or material part 
of the property herein leased as a service 
station for the sale and the storage of gaso-
line and petroleum products, or if the use of 
the premises as a serviee station shall l1e in 
any substantial or material manner restrict-
ed, or if the flow of traffic is substantially 
or materially altered aica.y from the lrasrrl 
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premises as a result of the use of the antici-
pated Interstate Highway No.15 in the Orem, 
Utah area, which highway is planned for con-
struction in the Orem, Utah area as of the 
date of this agreement, or should any govern-
mental authority refuse at any time during 
the term or extension of this lease to grant 
such permits as may be necessary for the in-
stallation of reasonable equipment and opera-
tion of said premises as a service station, then 
the lessee may, at its option, surrender and 
cancel this lease, remove its improvements 
and equipment from said property and be 
relieved from the payment of rent or any 
other obligation as of the date of such sur-
render. (Emphasis added) (R. 34) 
Paragraphs 7 and 10 of Count III of the proposed 
Amended Complaint also allege that the mistake as to 
the meaning of the lease agreement was a mutual 
mistake between all parties to the lease or, if not a mutual 
mistake, then the conduct of the defendants in failing to 
advise the plaintiff that the lease agreement as reduced 
to writing did not correctly embody the agreement of 
the parties, was wrongful and fraudulent. (R. 33) 
By its motion to the trial court requiring the plaintiff 
to make deposits in court pendente lite, the plaintiff 
song ht the court's permission to pay into court the $275 
per month reserved as rental payments under the terms 
of the lease. (R. 50) 
The plaintiff has not used the leased premises for any 
purpose whatsoever since January 1, 1965 and since that 
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date the premises have been vacant and have produced 
no income to the plaintiff, (R. 53) and although the plain-
tiff used its best efforts to sublet or otherwise economi-
cally use the property, it has been unable to do so since 
January 1, 1965. (R. 53) 
Between January 1, 1965 and the time the plaintiff 
filed its motion for an order requiring deposits to be made 
into court pendente lite the plaintiff paid to the defend-
ants the monthly rental of $275 per month for a total of 
$2750 during which time the plaintiff received no income 
from the property. (R. 53) The amount of $1100 of the 
$2750 paid as aforesaid was paid between the time this 
action was filed on July 1, 1965 and the filing of plain-
tiff's motion for the requested order. (R. 53, 54) 
After a hearing on the plaintiff's motions, the trial 
court :refused to set aside the Summary Judgment and 
denied the plaintiff's motion for permission to file its 
proposed Amended Complaint, and also denied the plain-
tiff's motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to make 
deposits of the monthly rental in court pending the termi-
nation of the litigation. (R. 86) 
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the trial court's 
Summary Judgment and Order denying the plaintiff's 
motions were affirmed in an opinion filed on April 12, 
1966. Said opinion makes no comment whatsoever on 
the failure of the trial court to permit the plaintiff to 
file Count III of its proposed Amended Complaint which 
Count, as stated previously, alleges a cause of action for 
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reformation of the subject lease. Likewise, said opinion 
makes no reference to the trial court's failure to order 
the plaintiff to make deposits into court pendente lite. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN AF-
FIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER 
DENYING THE PLAINTIFF PERMISSION 
TO FILE COUNT III OF PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPOSED AMENDED COMPLAINT 
In the Supreme Court's opinion this case was char-
acterized as an ''appeal from a decision that interpreted 
a service station lease agreement.'' While such char-
acterization is partially correct, apparently the court 
overlooked the fact that the plaintiff not only sought 
interpretation of the lease, but alternatively, the plain-
tiff sought REFORMATION of the same agreement. To 
that end the plaintiff sought permission to file an Amend-
ed complaint and Count III thereof states a valid cause 
of action for reformation of the lease between the parties. 
Adequate grounds for such reformation were alleged in-
asmuch as paragraph 7 of Count III alleges a mutual mis-
take on the part of all parties involved, and paragraph 
10 of said Count alleges that "if the defendants did not 
share plaintiff's mistaken belief that the actual agree-
ment of the parties had been reduced to writing then the 
conduct of the defendants, all and each of them, in failing 
to advised plaintiff that the lease agreement as reduced 
to writing did not correctly embody the agreement of 
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the parties was ·wrongful and fraudulent.'' Paragraph 
11 then proceeds to allege the true agreement between 
the parties with regard to the plaintiff's right to a total 
abatement of rent or termination of the lease agreement. 
This jurisdiction recognizes and accepts the well es-
tablished rule that an instrument is subject to reforma-
tion on the ground of mutual mistake or fraud. In Nais-
bitt v. Hodges, 6 Ut. 2d 116, 307 P. 2d 620 (1957) Mr. 
Justice McDonough, writing for a unanimous court, 
stated: 
''There are numerous cases in this jurisdiction 
dealing with reformation of an instrument on the 
ground of mutual mistake. The guiding criteria 
are well established. Mutual mistake of fact may 
be defined as error in reducing the concurring in-
tentions of the parties to writing. . .. '' 
Earlier in McMahon v. Tan!Jier, 122 Ut. 333, 249 P. 
2d 502 (1952), a unanimous Utah court held as follows 
at 249 P. 2d 506: 
"The principal applicable ... is well stated in the 
case of Spirit vs. Albert, 109 Conn. 292, 146 Atlan-
tic 717, 720: 'Where unknown to one of the par-
ties, an instrument contains a mistake rendering 
it as variance with the prior understanding and 
a(J'reement of the parties, and the other party ~ . 
learns of this mistake at the time of the execution 
of the instrument and later seeks to take advan-
ta O'e of it equity will reform the instrument so as 
to 
0
make it conf~rm to the prior understanding.' " 
So far as we are able to determine, the law of the State 
of Utah is no different today. 
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Although the plaintiff first attempted to reform the 
subject lease by way of its proposed Amended Complaint, 
we fail to perceive any reason why both the trial court 
and the Supreme Court refused to permit the pleading 
of the cause of action for reformation. Our Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 15 authorizes amended and supplemental 
pleadings as fallows: 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his 
pleading once as a matter of course at any time 
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the 
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is 
permitted and the action has not been placed upon 
the trial calendar, he may still amend it at any 
time within twenty days after it is served. Other-
wise, a party may amend his pleading only by 
leave of court or by written consent of the ad-
verse party; and leave shall be freely given wh-en 
Justice so requires. A party shall plead in response 
to an amended pleading within the time remain-
ing for response to the original pleading or with-
in ten days after service of the amended pleading, 
whichever period may be the longer, unless the 
court otherwise orders. (Emphasis added) 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8( e) provides as 
follows: 
A party may set forth two or more statements 
of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, 
either in one count or defense or in separate counts 
or defenses. \Vhen two or more statements are 
made in the alternative and one of them made in-
dependently would be sufficient, the pleading is 
not made insufficient bv the insufficiency of one or 
more of the altrrnativ~ statements. A party may 
also state as many separate claims or defenses as 
he has, regardless of consistency, and whether 
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based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. 
All statements shall be made subject to the obli-
gations set forth in Rule 11. 
Also relevant to this inquiry is Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 18(a) which provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
(a) J oinder of Claims. The plaintiff in its 
complaint or in a reply setting forth a counter-
claim and the defendant in an answer setting forth 
a counterclaim may join either as independent or 
as alternate claims as many claims legal or equi-
table or both as he may have against an opposing 
party .... 
From the foregoing Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
it is apparent that Count III of the plaintiff's proposed 
Amended Complaint was not unacceptable because it was 
joined with other claims in the proposal, nor because 
alternative relief was prayed for, nor because the claims 
described therein may not have been entirely consistent. 
More particularly, Rule 15 clearly indicates that per-
mission to amend a pleading shall be liberally granted. 
As was stated by Justice Wade in Ballard v. Buist, 8 Ut. 
2d 308, 333 P. 2d 1071 (1959): 
It has always been the rule in this State to be 
liberal in the allowance of amendments to the 
end that there can be a complete adjudication of 
the controversy upon the merits and so that justice 
may be served. 
In addition, although it was decided prior to the enact-
ment of our present Rule 15, Prom City Y. Claudin, 91 Ut. 
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60, 63 P. 2d 570 (1936) contains the following pertinent 
comment by Justice Wolfe: 
It must be noted that the court may, upon sus-
taining a demurrer, refuse to permit an amend-
ment to a pleading if it deems no amendment can 
he made which will circumvent the ruling .... In 
such case, the pleader is virtually out of court, 
it is as if the court had said, 'your pleading is not 
good in law and, under the facts as I apprehend 
they can be pleaded, you cannot state a good action 
or defense in law.' Naturally, it is not usually done 
on a :first complaint or answer because the court 
cannot ordinarily know that other facts to make 
the pleading good cannot be pleaded. And a re-
fusal to permit pleading over where it does not 
appear positive that no cause of action or defense 
can be pleaded may run easily into an abuse of 
discretion. 
Upon application of the criteria described by Justice 
Wolfe, it is submitted that Count III of the plaintiff's 
proposed Amended Complaint does ''state a good 
action.'' Thus, the refusal on the part of the trial court 
and the Supreme Court to permit the pleading of Count 
III is improper. Unlike Counts I and II of the proposed 
Amended Complaint, which Counts the Supreme Court 
considered. and rejected in its recent decision, Count III 
is not defective because the language of the lease agree-
ment is clearly against the plaintiff. On the contrary, the 
purpose of reforming the lease is to change that which 
is clear, but does not express the agreement of the parties. 
Nor does the claim for reformation of the agreement run 
Rfoul of the parol evidence rule since that rule is not 
applicable to an action for reformation. (See Sine v. 
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Harper, 118 Ut. 415, 222 P. 2d 571 (1950) and Degnan, 
Parol Evidence - The Utah Version, 5 Utah Law Re-
view, 158, 175 (1956).) 
\Ve simply cannot conceive of any legitimate reason 
why the trial court and the Supreme Court have re-
fused to permit plaintiff to file its proposed Amended 
Complaint so far as Count III is concerned. The hold-
ing in Lone Star Motor Imports, Inc. v. Citroeon Cars 
Corporation, ( C.A. 5th, 1961) 288 F. 2d 69, is in point. It 
was there held that where no grounds whatsoever exist 
for denial of leave to amend a pleading, the test for 
abuse of discretion is satisfied and the trial court must 
be reversed upon appeal. Not ha Ying been allowed to 
file its claim for reformation, the plaintiff has not had the 
opportunity to present evidence in support thereof. Thus, 
the refusal to allow prosecution of Count III is tanta-
mount to a dismissal of the cause of action for reforma-
tion of the lease without any hearing whatsoever. Surely, 
such refusal is an abuse of discretion. 
In the present case, the plaintiff's motion for leaYe 
to file the proposed Amended Complaint was made within 
ten days after the plaintiff received notice that the de-
fendants' motion for Summary Judgment had been grant-
ed. In addition: no prejudice whatsoever would haw 
resulted to the defendants had the plaintiff been allowed 
to plead Count III as proposed, plaintiff's motion was 
the first occasion permission to so plead had been sought, 
the motion was not an attempt to delay the proceedings, 
nor can it be saicl tlw motion was made in bad faith. Thr 
letter as well as the spirit of the law applicable to this 
issue clearly entitle the plaintiff to a hearing on its claim 
for reformation of the lease agreement. 
POINT NO. 2 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN AF-
FIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN 
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO MAKE 
DEPOSITS OF THE MONTHLY RENTAL 
INTO COURT PENDENTE LITE 
In the event the plaintiff is not permitted to file Count 
III of its proposed Amended Complaint as contended for 
in Point No. 1 of this brief, the issue raised by this Point 
No. 2 is moot and requires no consideration. However, 
assuming the court reverses itself as urged and the plain-
tiff is permitted to file Count III of its proposed Amend-
ed Complaint then the plaintiff submits that affirmation 
of the trial court's Order denying plaintiff's motion for 
an Order requiring the plaintiff to make deposits of the 
monthly rental into court pendente lite was erroneous. 
The reader is directed to the plaintiff's brief on file 
herein, pp. 26-35, for Points and Authorities in support of 
plaintiff's eonteution in this Point No. 2. 
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CONCLUSION 
For those reasons hereinabove set forth the court 
should grant a rehearing in this case for the purpose of 
reconsidering only those issues raised by the petition for 
rehearing. Totally absent from the court's original opin-
ion is any reason why the plaintiff should not be per-
mitted to file Count III of its proposed Amended Com-
plaint and make deposits of the monthly rental into court 
pendente lite. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES & HENDERSON 
By KENT B LINEBAUGH 
800 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Pla.intiff and Appellant 
